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In mid-afternoon on April 22, Peruvian special forces carried out a surprise daylight attack on the
residence of Japan's ambassador to Peru, Morihisa Aoki, where Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac
Amaru (MRTA) rebels had been holding 72 hostages since Dec. 17 (see NotiSur, 01/10/97, 01/31/97,
02/07/97, 02/21/97). During the operation, one hostage, two military officers, and all 14 rebels were
killed.
President Alberto Fujimori, who had vowed not to accede to rebel demands, was openly exhilarated
at the outcome of the operation. "Despite the casualties suffered during the operation, I can
clearly say that the result was a complete success," said Fujimori. At about 3:20 p.m., 140 military
commandos stormed the compound. The operation ended after 45 minutes of heavy gunfire and
several explosions. Later, the president confirmed that Supreme Court justice Carlos Giusti Acuna
and two military officers were dead along with all the rebels. Giusti had been wounded during the
rescue operation and died later of a heart attack.
Several soldiers and as many as 25 hostages were also wounded and taken to nearby hospitals. One
news agency quoted a source close to the government who, when asked about all the rebels dying in
the action, replied, "In rescue operations, according to the rules of military procedure, no prisoners
are taken." Planning for the attack began shortly after the hostages were taken last December.
The hostages were warned in advance of the assault, which apparently helped facilitate the rescue
operation and keep their casualties to a minimum.
Bolivian Ambassador Jorge Gumucio said that some of the military officers among the hostages
warned the others 10 minutes before the attack began. "We were waiting for them to come in, and
it was done with surgical precision, but with some cost," said Gumucio. "The operation began with
an explosion where they [the rebels] were playing soccer. Explosives had been placed in tunnels
underneath the floor, and immediately the special troops came in through additional tunnels."
In the 126 days since the MRTA took over the ambassador's residence during a party honoring
Japan's Emperor Hirohito, negotiations have moved in fits and starts, despite efforts by a meditating
team that included the Canadian ambassador, the International Red Cross representative, and the
archbishop of Ayacucho. The last round of talks broke down March 12. The rebels had demanded
freedom for hundreds of their jailed comrades, but Fujimori had insisted that "not even one"
terrorist would be freed.
Following the rescue, Fujimori told reporters that the MRTA had reduced its demands to the
liberation of 20 prisoners. Nevertheless, the president said, he never considered the option, since "I
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gave my word to Prime Minister Hashimoto and to the international community. We will never give
in to terrorist blackmail."
Fujimori staked his political career, including plans for a possible third term, on the success of the
hostage rescue, and he is clearly savoring what he considers a resounding success. There is little
doubt that, at least in the short term, he will reap significant political benefits. Reaction to rescue
operation is generally favorable Since the ambassador's residence is considered Japanese territory,
it was assumed that no military rescue would be attempted without approval from the Japanese
government, and Japan had been adamantly against the use of force to free the hostages.
After the rescue, Japan's Foreign Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto expressed regret that he was not
informed until after the operation began. However, he acknowledged that nothing succeeds like
success. "Now that all the hostages are saved, who can denounce Mr. Fujimori for whether he did or
did not inform us or use force," Hashimoto said.
Press reports in Japan indicated that the Japanese government was aware of the likelihood of
storming the residence and was turning a blind eye toward the operation. Whatever the Japanese
knew, Fujimori defended their exclusion from the decision. "I have received the sympathy of Prime
Minister Hashimoto, whom my government had not informed prior to the operation," said Fujimori.
"I did not do so because in this type of rescue, the element of surprise is important."
Most initial reactions in Peru and internationally praised the Peruvian leader for the stunning
rescue. The Peruvian Congress hailed Fujimori and declared Giusti and the two dead officers as
national heroes. The opposition party Union por el Peru (UPP) also praised Fujimori, saying his
government did everything to end the standoff peacefully, but the firm stand of the rebels made it
impossible.
In Washington, US Defense Secretary William Cohen said the Peruvian government was left with no
other option despite diligent efforts to end the hostage drama peacefully. "We would have preferred
to see the resolution take place by more peaceful means, but that was simply a preference," said
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, adding that his government lamented the deaths
occurred during the assault.
However, Ecuador's envoy to the Organization of American States, Julio Prado, a human rights
advocate, deplored Peru's military solution to the hostage crisis. Prado said that Fujimori wanted a
victory even if it required violence. Other critics also expressed fear that Fujimori's newly increased
stature could bode ill for any improvement in human rights or the conditions of prisoners.
The Peruvian human rights umbrella group Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos
(CNDDHH) said that it shares the happiness of the hostages who have been reunited with their
families after the "reprehensible" kidnapping by the MRTA. The group said, however, that it could
not celebrate because of the loss of human lives that the operation cost.
The CNDDHH said it "maintained and maintains today, following the outcome, that dialogue
and a peaceful solution is always preferable to the most perfect military solution." The CNDDHH
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continued, "Lasting peace requires strengthening democracy and the state of law, constructing
a culture of dialogue, re-establishing violated rights, reducing inequality and poverty, exercising
effective democratic control over the armed forces, and ending impunity in Peru."

Fujimori approves attack to counter reverses
Analysts of the Peruvian situation, including Coletta Youngers of the Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA), attribute Fujimori's decision to carry out the attack to several recent reverses.
These include his dismal drop in public approval, with recent polls showing an approval rating of
only about 35%, down from more than 42% just a month ago and 70% when he won re-election in
1995.
In addition, Fujimori was being urged increasingly to make concessions to end the crisis by one
faction within the security forces, while hard-liners in the military, including Chief of Staff Gen.
Nicolas de Bari Hermoza Rios, pushed for a military response. Adding to tensions within Fujimori's
inner circle were continuing allegations against his close aide and security advisor, Vladamiro
Montesinos. Montesinos has been accused of ties to the notorious "Grupo Colina," responsible for
several brutal massacres in the early 1990s, and to drug trafficking.
The Brazilian National Police recently reported that Montesinos served as an advisor to captured
Colombian drug trafficker Evaristo Porras. Contributing to dissention within the security forces
were the recent murder of a female intelligence agent and the torture of another (see other article
in this edition). With all that, the hostage crisis had become a political crisis in Peru as well. Interior
Minister Gen. Juan Briones Davila resigned on April 19, assuming political responsibility for the
security lapse that allowed the rebel attack.
Also resigning was prestigious chief of police Antonio Ketin Vidal Herrera who, as then head
of the anti-terrorist unit DINCOTE, was responsible for the 1992 capture of Sendero Luminoso
leader Abimael Guzman. Vidal said that "recurrent questioning" of the police's actions made
him morally obliged to tender his resignation. This was an apparent reference to accusations by
opposition politicians and journalists that the police were behind recent threats they had received.
The replacement of Briones and Vidal by hard-liners Gen. Cesar Saucedo and Gen. Fernando
Dianderas, respectively, was seen as the work of the two most powerful allies of Fujimori, Hermoza
Rios and Montesinos.
Political analysts said the changes had to do as much with the feud within the security forces
as with assigning blame for the rebel attack. The day after the rescue, Montesinos made an
extremely rare appearance, arriving at the ambassador's residence with Gen. Hermoza. Some
analysts speculated that the appearance was an attempt to "clean up" the deteriorated image of the
Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) as well as Montesinos's personal image. Meanwhile, MRTA
spokesperson Isaac Velasco vowed on Bolivian radio that the group would retaliate for the deaths of
their comrades by attacking Peruvian military and economic targets.
While many commentators concluded that the MRTA's hostage-taking was a desperate attempt
to resuscitate a dying movement estimated to have fewer than 200 armed members others warned
against drawing hasty conclusions, since the MRTA was already considered finished once before.
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WOLA representative Youngers, for example, said the MRTA has actually gained ground. "The
MRTA already made a tremendous political coup through this action," she said. "They're back on
the political scene like they weren't a year ago." (Sources: Agence France-Presse, 04/21/97, 04/22/97;
Notimex, Reuter, Spanish news service EFE, 04/20/97, 04/22/97, 04/23/97; United Press International,
04/21-23/97; La Republica (Peru), National Public Radio, The Miami Herald, 04/23/97; Associated
Press, 04/20/97, 04/22-24/97)
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